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Abstract
We introduce lotteries (randomized trading) into search-theoretic models of money.
In a model with indivisible goods and at money, we show goods trade with proba-
bility 1 and money trades with probability  , where  < 1 i¤ buyers have su¢ cient
bargaining power. With divisible goods, a nonrandom quantity q trades with prob-
ability 1 and, again, money trades with probability  where  < 1 i¤ buyers have
su¢ cient bargaining power. Moreover, q never exceeds the e¢ cient quantity (not
true without lotteries). We consider several extensions designed to get commodities
as well as money to trade with probability less than 1, and to illuminate the e¢ ciency
role of lotteries.
We have benetted from the comments of Gabriel Camera, Dean Corbae, John Moore, Martin
Schindler, and Neil Wallace, as well as participants in seminars at the Cornell-PSU Macro Workshop,
the Conference on Exchange in Search Equilibrium at PSU, the 1998 SED, 1999 European Economic As-
sociation and 1999 European Econometric Society meetings, the Universities of Pennsylvania, Vienna and
Western Ontario, and the London School of Economics. An anonymous referee and associate editor also
made several important comments and suggestions. The National Science Foundation and the Schweiz-
erische Nationalfonds provided nancial support. Last but not least, for their hospitable and stimulating
environment we thank Cafe Lutecia in Philadelphia (where we did most of the work on this project).
1
1 Introduction
In this paper we introduce lotteries that is, randomized trading into search-theoretic
models of monetary exchange. There are several reasons for doing so. First, consider
the most basic version of the model, with indivisible goods and money and a storage
technology that allows agents to inventory at most one object at a time (Kiyotaki and
Wright [1991, 1993]). Although this model is simplistic, it does have virtues. In particular,
since every trade is a one-for-one swap, one can relatively easily study certain aspects of
the exchange process and illustrate certain interesting features of money without having to
determine exchange rates or the distribution of inventories. To the extent that this model
is useful, one would like to understand its properties. It is well known from the study of
various economic environments with indivisibilities or other nonconvexities that agents can
often do better using randomized rather than deterministic trading mechanisms, and so it
is interesting to ask if there is a role for lotteries in this model, too.1
With indivisible goods and money, bargaining over lotteries means bargaining over the
joint probability distribution of (q;m), where q 2 f0; 1g is the amount of the good and
m 2 f0; 1g the amount of money to be exchanged. We show that monetary equilibria exist
i¤ buyers (agents with money) have bargaining power  above some threshold. If  is above
the threshold but not too large, then when a buyer meets a seller with a good he desires he
gives the seller money with probability 1 and receives the good with probability 1. If  is
larger, however, he gives up the money with probability  < 1, while the good still changes
hands with probability 1, independent of whether the money changes hands. Hence, for
1Analyses of nonconvexities and lotteries include Prescott and Townsend (1984a, 1984b), Rogerson
(1988), Diamond (1990), Shell and Wright (1993), and Chatterjee and Corbae (1995). One di¤erence from
the previous literature (with the exception of Diamond) is that all those papers study competitive models,
while our environment is strategic.
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some parameters there is a role for nondegenerate lotteries. Moreover, lotteries allow us
to discuss a notion of prices, even with indivisible goods and money, since  is the average
amount of currency that trades for a good.2
Now consider the model with divisible consumption goods, where even if we continue
to assume that money is indivisible and agents have a unit storage capacity, prices can
be determined by letting agents bargain over the quantity of goods buyers get for a unit
of currency (Shi [1995]; Trejos and Wright [1995]). Agents again bargain over the joint
probability distribution of (q;m), but now q 2 [0;1). In this model, there is a unique
monetary equilibrium for all parameters, and when a buyer meets a seller with a good
he desires, he gives him money with probability  where again  is strictly less than 1
i¤  is above some threshold, and gets q units of the good with probability 1 where q is
deterministic and independent of whether the money changes hands. Hence, there is also
a role for lotteries even if goods are perfectly divisible.
Furthermore, we show that q may be less than but can never exceed the e¢ cient quantity
q (dened below). One reason this is interesting is the following. It is natural to expect
q less than q in a monetary model, as argued in Trejos and Wright (1995), for example;
but one can only rule out q > q for some parameters in the model in that paper, where
lotteries were not allowed. Once we allow lotteries, one can show q  q for all parameters.
Moreover, this immediately implies that welfare is higher, and strictly higher for some
2We emphasize here that lotteries are di¤erent from mixed strategies. In particular, with indivisible
goods and money and no lotteries, suppose (as is common) that there exists both a pure strategy equi-
librium where money is accepted and a nonmonetary equilirbium where it is not. Then there is a mixed
strategy equilibrium where money is accepted with probability in (0; 1). In a mixed strategy equilibrium
sellers are indi¤erent between having and not getting the money, while in the lottery model, by contrast,
sellers strictly prefer getting the money. Once we allow lotteries, mixed strategy equilibria of the above
variety no longer exist. Thus, another reason to introduce lotteries is that this serves to eliminate the
somewhat unnatural mixed equilibria.
3
parameters, when lotteries are allowed, in this model. This is not necessarily so in the
indivisible goods model, where allowing lotteries can actually reduce welfare for some
values of the bargaining power parameter. However, we show that if we solve the social
planners problem of maximizing ex ante utility, as opposed to looking for equilibria for
arbitrary bargaining power parameters, we also show that lotteries increase welfare in the
indivisible goods model.
One perhaps surprising feature of both models described above is the asymmetry be-
tween goods and money: goods always change hands with probability 1 while money may
change hands with probability  < 1. To investigate what is behind this result, we discuss
some alternative models, including ones where agents barter consumption goods directly,
where there is commodity rather than at money, and where the bargaining powers of
agents varies across meetings. In each case, goods may trade with probability less than
1, and we discuss the reasons. Also, on the subject of commodity money, we nd that
if a commodity money is su¢ ciently intrinsically valuable then equilibria are necessarily
e¢ cient. Moreover, the introduction of lotteries allows us to derive a new version of Gre-
shams Law, which says that a su¢ ciently valuable commodity money will be withdrawn
from circulation in a probabilistic sense, but this will not harm the e¢ ciency of exchange.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic assump-
tions underlying all of the models. In Section 3 we analyze the version with indivisible
goods. In Section 4 we analyze the version with divisible goods. Section 5 considers the
various extensions. Section 6 concludes.3
3Note that in in this paper we do not consider models where both money and goods are divisible, or
where money is indivisible but agents can hold multiple units in inventory, such as such as the models of
Molico (1996), Green and Zhou (1997), Zhou (1998), Camera and Corbae (1998), Taber and Wallace (1998)
or Berentsen (1998), since they are an order of magnitude more complicated than the models studied here.
The role for lotteries in those environments is an open question.
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2 The General Model
The economy is populated by a [0; 1] continuum of innitely-lived agents who specialize in
consumption and production. Assume consumption goods are non-storable so that they
cannot serve as money. Let Xi be the set of goods that agent i consumes. No agent i
produces a good in Xi. Moreover, for a pair of agents i and j selected at random, the
probability that i produces a good in Xj and j also produces a good in Xi is 0 (there is
never a double coincidences of wants), while the probability that i produces a good in Xj
but j does not produce a good in Xi is x 2 (0; 1). For example, if there are N goods and
N types, N > 2, and each type i agent consumes only good i and produces only good
i + 1 (modN), then x = 1=N . Let Q denote the set of feasible quantities that agents can
produce. We will consider two cases: the indivisible goods model, where Q = f0; 1g, and
the divisible goods model, where Q = <+.
For every agent i, preferences are described as follows. He derives utility u (q) from
q units of any good in Xi, and incurs disutility c (q) from producing q units. We always
assume u (0) = c (0) = 0. For the divisible goods model, we assume that both u and c are
C2, and that u0 (q) > 0, c0 (q) > 0, u00 (q)  0 and c00 (q)  0, with at least one of the weak
inequalities holding strictly, for all q > 0. We also assume u0 (0) > c0 (0) = 0, and that
there exists a q > 0 such that u (q) = c (q). For the indivisible goods model, let u (1) = U
and c (1) = C and assume U > C > 0. The rate of time preference is r > 0.
In addition to the consumption goods described above, there is also an object that
cannot be produced or consumed called at money. We assume that money is indivisible
and that individuals have a single unit storage capacity, so that if a fraction M 2 (0; 1)
of the population are each initially endowed with one unit of money then (given no one
disposes of the stu¤) there will always beM agents with and 1 M agents without money.
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We call agents with money buyers and agents without sellers. Agents meet randomly
according to a Poisson process with arrival rate . Thus, the probability per unit time
that buyer i meets a seller j such that j produces a good in Xi is  (1 M)x, and the
probability that seller j meets a buyer i such that j produces a good inXi is Mx. Without
lost of generality, we normalize x = 1 by choosing units of time appropriately.
We want to consider exchanges that may be random. Dene an event to be a pair
(q;m), where q 2 Q denotes the quantity of the good and m 2 f0; 1g the amount of
money that is traded. Let E  Q  f0; 1g denote the space of such events and E denote
the Borel -algebra. Dene a lottery to be a probability measure  on the measurable
space (E; E). One can always write  (q;m) = m(m)qjm (q), where m is the marginal
probability measure of m and qjm is the conditional probability measure of q given m.
Then to reduce notation let m (m = 1) =  and m (m = 0) = 1   ; thus,  2 [0; 1] is the
probability that the money changes hands. A lottery can be completely described by the
probability  and the two probability measures qj0 and qj1.4
Let Vm denote the value function for an agent with m 2 f0; 1g units of money. The
expected payo¤s from a lottery for a buyer and a seller are given by
1 = 

V0 +
Z
u(q)qj1(dq)

+ (1  )

V1 +
Z
u (q)qj0(dq)

0 = 

V1  
Z
c(q)qj1(dq)

+ (1  )

V0  
Z
c (q)qj0(dq)

:
We focus on symmetric equilibria, where in any meeting between a buyer and a seller that
4One may question how agents can commit to the outcome of the lottery. For example, suppose that
we agree to randomize so that you give me the good for sure and we ip a coin to see whether I give you
the money. If the coin comes up so that I keep the money, will you still give me the good? Of course, in
any exchange some notion of commitment is required, but perhaps it is more delicate when objects are not
exchanged simultaneously. To the extent that one might worry about this, there are devices to get around
the problem. For example, if I am supposed to give you the money with probability n=m, I can put it in
one of m boxes and shu­ e them, and then we can simultaneously swap n of the boxes for the good.
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produces a good the buyer wants, they agree to the same lottery. Then we can write
Bellmans equations as follows:
rV1 = (1 M) (1   V1)
rV0 = M (0   V0) :
(1)
For example, the rst of these equations sets the ow value to being a buyer, rV1, equal to
the rate at which he meets sellers who produce a good in Xi, which is simply 1 M (given
x = 1), times the net gain from playing the lottery.
We employ the generalized Nash bargaining solution. That is, we determine  , qj0 and
qj1 by solving
max (1   T1) (0   T0)1  (2)
where T1 and T0 are the threat points of the buyer and the seller, respectively, and  2 [0; 1]
is the bargaining power of the buyer. It is well known that this is equivalent to an explicit
strategic bargaining model of the sort developed by Rubinstein (1982) when the time
between o¤ers and countero¤ers vanishes, where  and Tj depend on details of the strategic
environment. In what follows we allow  to take on any value in [0; 1], and consider two
cases for the threat points have been used in the previous literature: Tj = Vj, which follows
from the strategic model if one assumes individuals continue to meet other potential trading
partners between bargaining rounds; and Tj = 0, which follows from the strategic model
if one assumes they cannot meet other trading partners between rounds.5 We also impose
incentive compatibility conditions to guarantee agents bargain voluntarily:
1  V1 and 0  V0: (3)
A steady state equilibrium for this economy is a list
 
V1; V0;  ; qj0; qj1

such that: the
5See Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) or Osborne and Rubinstein (1990); see Coles and Wright
(1998) for an exposition in the context of monetary search theory.
7
value functions satisfy the Bellman equations in (1) taking the lottery as given; and the
lottery solves the maximization problem in (2) subject to the constraints in (3) taking the
value functions as given. If qj0(0) = qj1(0) = 1 or  = 0 the equilibrium is called non-
monetary, and otherwise it is called monetary. It is clear that a nonmonetary equilibrium
always exists. From now on we focus on monetary equilibria. In any monetary equilibria,
the second constraint in (3) can be rearranged to yield
V1   V0 
Z
c(q)qj1(dq) +
1  

Z
c(q)qj0(dq) > 0: (4)
Hence, V1 > V0. In the next two sections we analyze in turn the two models, withQ = f0; 1g
and Q = <+.
3 The Indivisible Goods Model
When q 2 f0; 1g, a lottery is completely described by  , plus two numbers, 1  qj1(q = 1)
and 0  qj0(q = 1), which give the probabilities that the good changes hands conditional
on money changing hands and conditional on money not changing hands, respectively (of
course, 0 is irrelevant if  = 1 and 1 is irrelevant if  = 0). Given any lottery one can
solve (1) for the value functions, substitute into (3), and verify that the rst constraint
holds for all parameters, while the second holds i¤
rC  (1 M)(U   C): (5)
Notice that 1 and 0 do not appear in this expression. So that monetary equilibria may
exist, we assume
C <

1 M
r + 1 M

U; (6)
since otherwise (5) could not be satised for any   1 (we ignore the non-generic case
where the condition holds with equality).
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We begin by briey reviewing the standard model, where lotteries are ruled out. Let 

denote the probability that money is accepted by a seller. Then
rV1 = (1 M) 
 (U + V0   V1)
rV0 = M
 (V1   V0   C) :
In this model, which is essentially the one in Kiyotaki andWright (1993), there is nothing to
bargain over, and an equilibrium is simply a list (V1; V0;
) such that either: V1 V0 C  0
and 
 = 1; V1   V0   C  0 and 
 = 0; or 0 < 
 < 1 and V1   V0   C = 0. Given (6), it
is easy to see that there exists an equilibrium with 
 = 0, an equilibrium with 
 = 1, and
an equilibrium with 
 = rC=(1 M)(U   C) 2 (0; 1).
We claim that the equilibrium with 
 2 (0; 1) is an artifact of ruling out lotteries. To
see this, notice that in such an equilibrium the seller is indi¤erent between trading and not
trading, V1   V0   C = 0, while the buyer strictly prefers to trade, U + V0   V1 > 0. This
means that trading with probability less than 1 is inconsistent with e¢ cient bargaining.
To see this, think about the strategic game of alternating o¤ers that underlies the Nash
solution, and suppose that buyer i makes seller j the following o¤er: i will give j the money
with probability 1 and j will give i the good with probability 1. Then there will be 1 < 1
such that both i and j strictly prefer to trade. Consequently, there are no equilibria with

 2 (0; 1) once we allow lotteries and bargaining, and we can set 
 = 1.6
The following proposition characterizes the set of equilibria when the threat points are
given by the continuation values.
6This is essentially the same argument that rules out mixed strategy monetary equilibria in the divisible
goods model, except that there the buyer o¤ers to take a slightly smaller quantity while here he o¤ers to
take the indivisible quantity with a slightly lower probability. Note that we will actually show below that
in any monetary equilibrium the good changes hands with probability 1 = 1 in this model; setting 1 < 1
was only used to show that 
 < 1 is not an equilibrium.
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Proposition 1 Assume Tj = Vj. Then there are critical values 1 and 1 constructed
in the proof, with 0 < 1 < 1 < 1, such that the following is true: if  < 1 there is
no monetary equilibrium; if  2 (1; 1] there exists a unique monetary equilibrium and it
entails  = 1 and 1 = 1; and if  > 1 there exists a unique monetary equilibrium and it
entails 1 = 0 = 1 and  =  1 2 (0; 1), where
 1 =
r [C + (1  )U ]
(  M)(U   C) :
Proof: In this model (2) reduces to choosing ( ; 0; 1) 2 [0; 1] [0; 1] [0; 1] to solve
max (1   V1) (0   V0)1 
where 1 = (1U +V0)+(1  )(0U +V1) and 0 = ( 1C+V1)+(1  )( 0C+V0),
taking V1 and V0 as given. Necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a solution are
 [V0   V1 + (1   0)U ] (0   V0)
+ (1  ) [V1   V0   (1   0)C] (1   V1)    0; = if  > 0
U (0   V0)  (1  ) C (1   V1)  1  0; = if 1 > 0
 (1  )U (0   V0)  (1  ) (1  )C (1   V1)  0  0; = if 0 > 0:
(7)
where the js are nonnegative multipliers for the constraints that the choice variables
cannot exceed 1.
We are looking for monetary equilibria, which means that  > 0, and the rst condition
in (7) holds with equality. First consider the case  < 1, which implies  = 0. If 1 2 [0; 1)
then 1 = 0 and U (0   V0)  (1  ) C (1   V1), and combining this with the rst
condition in (7) yields U  C, which is a contradiction. A similar contradiction results if
0 2 [0; 1). Hence,  < 1 implies 1 = 0 = 1. Given this, we can solve (1) for the Vjs,
substitute them into rst condition in (7) at equality, and solve for  =  1, where  1 is
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given above. Notice that  1 2 (0; 1) i¤  > 1, where
1 =
(r +M)U  MC
(1 + r)(U   C) :
One can easily check that the incentive condition (5) is satised at  =  1. We conclude
that there exists an equilibrium with 1 = 0 = 1 and  =  1 2 (0; 1) i¤  > 1.
Now consider the case where  = 1. This means 1 > 0 in a monetary equilibrium,
and 0 is irrelevant so we simply set 0 = 1 (nothing actually depends on this but it
facilitates the argument). Inserting the Vjs into the second equation in (7) at equality and
rearranging, we arrive at:
1 fU [(1 M)U   (r + 1 M)C]  (1  )C [(r +M)U  MC]g = (1 + r)1: (8)
Suppose 1 < 1; then 1 = 0, and (8) can be satised only for the nongeneric parameter
value  = 1 where
1 =
C(1 + r)
(1 M)U +MC
1:
Hence, except for the nongeneric case  = 1, the only solution to (8) with 1 < 1 is 1 = 0.
Therefore, in any monetary equilibrium we have 1 = 1. But this means that (8) holds
i¤ the left hand side is non-negative, which is true i¤   1. So monetary equilibria are
only possible if   1 and 1 = 1. Given this, one can check that  = 1 satises the rst
condition in (7) i¤   1. One can also check that (5) is satised at  = 1. We conclude
that there exists an equilibrium with 1 = 1 and  = 1 i¤ 1    1.
Summarizing, an equilibrium with  2 (0; 1) exists i¤  > 1 and an equilibrium with
 = 1 exists i¤ 1    1, and in either case we have 0 = 1 = 1. Finally, one can verify
that 0 < 1 < 1 < 1 using (6). This completes the proof. 
For completeness, we also describe the model with Tj = 0. However, since the results
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are qualitatively the same (although  ,  and  change), and since the argument is the
same as in Proposition 1, we omit the proof (it is available upon request).
Proposition 2 Assume Tj = 0. Then there are critical values 0 and 0, with 0 < 0 <
0 < 1, such that the following is true: if  < 0 there exists no monetary equilibrium; if
 2 (0; 0] there exists a unique monetary equilibrium and it entails  = 1 and 1 = 1;
and if  > 0 there exists a unique monetary equilibrium and it entails 1 = 0 = 1 and
 =  0 2 (0; 1), where
 0 =
r [(r +M)C + (1  )(r + 1 M)U ]
[r(  M) +M(1 M)(2   1)] (U   C) :
Several comments are in order concerning these results. First, since  < 1, we have  2
(0; 1) in a region of parameter space with positive measure. Hence, the implicit restriction
made in the previous literature, that lotteries are not allowed, is indeed restrictive. Second,
there is an asymmetry in the model: money may change hands randomly, but goods either
change hands with probability 1 or not at all. This is depicted in Figure 1, which plots 
and  as functions of . As is clear, for  >  goods trade with probability 1 and money
trades randomly, for intermediate  2 ;  both objects trade with probability 1, and for
 <  monetary equilibria do not exist. We discuss this asymmetry further below.
Note that  measures the price level since it is the average number of units of money
that it takes to buy a good. One can show  is decreasing in , increasing in r, increasing
in C, and decreasing in U , for both the model with Tj = Vj and the model with Tj = 0.
The e¤ects of changes in M depend on which version of the model we use, however: one
can show @ 1=@M > 0, but, perhaps surprisingly, @ 0=@M > 0 i¤ r and M are not too
small. Also, as r ! 0 we have  ! 0 for all  >  (the  curve in Figure 1 becomes vertical
at  = ); thus, if  is big and agents are very patient buyers get the good virtually for
12
Figure 1: Monetary Equilibrium as a Function of .
free, which sellers are willing to go along with since on the small but positive chance they
get the money it will convey exactly the same benet to them.7
Finally, we mention welfare. For low  there is no monetary equilibrium, and the only
possible outcome is autarchy, where V1 = V0 = 0. If lotteries are ruled out then there is
an equilibrium where money is accepted and V1 > V0 > 0 for all parameters satisfying (6).
Hence, allowing lotteries can actually reduce welfare. This should not be too surprising,
however, as it simply says that agents may be better o¤ if they can commit to  = 1 rather
than bargaining in each bilateral meeting. In any case, we will see below that there is
a welfare-improving role for lotteries in a slight variant of this model, where we consider
commodity money, and where rather than looking for equilibria for an arbitrary value
of the bargaining weight  we look for incentive-feasible allocations that a social planner
7The thresholds also depend on r; in particular, as r ! 0, we have 1 ! M and 1 !
CM= [(1 M)U +MC] in the model with Tj = Vj , and 0 ! 1=2 and 0 ! C= (U + C) in the model with
Tj = 0. Other di¤erences between the models with di¤erent threat points include the following. When
Tj = 0, 0 > 1=2 for all r > 0, and so lotteries are not used when buyers and sellers have equal bargaining
power; but when Tj = Vj , it is possible to have  < 1 when  = 1=2. Also, as long as 1 and 0 are in
(0; 1), we have 0 < 1 i¤M > 1=2.
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might choose. Also, we will soon see that lotteries can only enhance welfare in the divisible
goods version of the model presented in the next section.
4 The Divisible Goods Model
When q 2 <+, a lottery is generally described by  and two conditional probability dis-
tributions, qj0 and qj1. However, we claim the amount of goods that changes hand is
degenerate and independent of whether money changes hands.
Proposition 3 There is a q (that depends on parameter values) such that qj0(q) =
qj1(q) = 1.
Proof: The Nash bargaining problem is to choose  2 [0; 1] and probability measures
qj0 and qj1 to solve
max


Z
u(q)qj1(dq) + V0

+ (1  )
Z
u(q)qj0(dq) + V1

  T1





 
Z
c(q)qj1(dq) + V1

+ (1  )

 
Z
c (q)qj0(dq) + V0

  T0
1 
subject to the incentive constraints in (3), taking V0 and V1 as given. Suppose that the solu-
tion implies qj0 and qj1 are nondegenerate, and let q0 =
R
qqj0(dq) and q1 =
R
qqj1(dq).
Since u(q) is concave and c(q) convex, and at least one is strictly so, by Jensens in-
equality the incentive constraints are still satised and the Nash product is higher when
qj0(q0) = qj1(q1) = 1, which is a contradiction. Hence, qj0 and qj1 are degenerate at
q0 and q1, respectively. Now suppose q0 6= q1, and let Eq = q1 + (1   )q0. Again, since
u(q) is concave and c(q) convex, the incentive constraints are still satised and the Nash
product is higher at Eq, another contradiction. 
The above result makes the analysis simpler because we can now restrict attention
to lotteries that are completely characterized by two numbers,  and q. Given any such
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lottery, one can, as in the previous section, solve (1) for the value functions, substitute in
(3), and verify that the rst constraint is never binding and the second is satised i¤
rc (q)   (1 M) [u (q)  c (q)]  0: (9)
In particular, if  = 1, then (9) holds i¤
' (q)  rc (q)  (1 M) [u (q)  c (q)]  0: (10)
It is easy to see that '(0) = 0, '0(0) < 0, '00(q)  0 for all q, and '(q) > 0 for large q;
hence, if  = 1 the constraints are satised i¤ q is below some critical value bq. Also, let
q be the e¢ cient quantity, dened by u0(q) = c0(q). It is easy to verify that q is the
quantity that maximizes welfare, W = MV1 + (1 M)V0. If q = q then (9) holds i¤
  b  rc (q)
(1 M) [u (q)  c (q)] ; (11)
which can hold i¤ r is not too big.
The following proposition characterizes the set of equilibria for the model with threat
points Tj = Vj.
Proposition 4 Assume Tj = Vj. If  = 0, there does not exist a monetary equilibrium.
If  > 0, then there is a critical value e1 constructed in the proof, where e1 > 0 for all
parameter values and e1 < 1 i¤ r < (1  M)[u(q)   c(q)]=c(q), such that the following
is true: if  < e1 there exists a unique monetary equilibrium and it entails  = 1 and
q < q, with @q=@ > 0 and lim!e1 q = q; and if  > e1 there exists a unique monetary
equilibrium and it entails q = q and  = e 1 2 (0; 1), where
e 1 = r [c (q) + (1  )u (q)]
(  M) [u (q)  c (q)] :
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Proof: If  = 0 then the bargaining solution is equivalent to take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers by
the seller, which implies u(q) = (V1   V0). Inserting this into (1), we nd V1 = 0, and
therefore V0 < 0 by (4). But a seller can always achieve V0 = 0 by not trading. Hence,
there cannot exist a monetary equilibrium when  = 0.
Now assume  > 0. Then (2) reduces to choosing ( ; q) 2 [0; 1]<+ to solve
max (1   V1) (0   V0)1  ;
where 1 = u(q) + V0 + (1   )V1 and 0 =  c(q) + V1 + (1   )V0. Necessary and
su¢ cient conditions for a solution are
u0 (q) (0   V0)  (1  ) c0 (q) (1   V1)  0; = if q > 0
 (V0   V1) (0   V0) + (1  ) (V1   V0) (1   V1)    0; = if  > 0
(12)
where  is the nonnegative multiplier on the constraint   1. We are looking for monetary
equilibria, which implies that both conditions hold with equality.
First consider the case where  < 1, which implies that  = 0. Then combining the
two rst order conditions yields u0(q) = c0(q), and so q = q. Solving (1) for the Vjs and
inserting the solutions, as well as q = q, into the second condition in (12), we can solve
for  = e 1 where e 1 is dened in the statement of the proposition. Notice that e 1 2 (0; 1)
i¤  > e1 where e1 = (r +M)u (q) Mc (q)
(1 + r) [u (q)  c (q)] :
One can check that e 1  b , where b is dened in (11), and therefore the incentive condition
(9) holds at  = e 1 and q = q. Hence, we conclude that there exists an equilibrium with
 = e 1 and q = q i¤  > e1.
Now consider the case where  = 1, which implies   0. By combining the two
conditions in (12), we get u0 (q)  c0 (q), and this implies q  q in any equilibrium with
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 = 1, with strict inequality as long as  > 0. Inserting the Vjs and  = 1, we can rewrite
the rst order condition for q as
(1  ) c0 (q)
u0 (q)
=
1 M   (r + 1 M)c(q)=u(q)
r +M  Mc(q)=u(q) : (13)
The left hand side of (13) is zero at q = 0 and it is strictly increasing. As q ! 0, the right
hand side approaches (1  M)=(r + M) > 0, because c(q)=u(q) ! 0 by lHopitals rule,
and it is strictly decreasing and equals 0 when q = bq, where recall that bq is the solution to
(10) at equality. Hence, there exists an unique solution to (13), call it  = (), in (0; bq).
Moreover, it is easy to check that 0() > 0 and that (e1) = q. Since we need ()  q
for an equilibrium with  = 1, an equilibrium of this type cannot exist if  > e1. If  < e1
then () < q, and we now show that this also implies the rst order condition for  is
satised at  = 1. To see this, rearrange the rst order condition for  as
  (r +M)u(q) Mc(q)
(1 + r)[u(q)  c(q)] : (14)
The right hand side of (14) is decreasing in  and approaches (r+M)=(1+r) > 0 as q ! 0.
Also, (14) is satised at equality when  = e1. Hence, (14) is satised i¤   e1. We
conclude that  = 1 and q = () satisfy the rst order conditions i¤   e1. Moreover,
since () < bq, it satises the incentive condition (10), and hence satises all of the
conditions for an equilibrium.
Finally, it is obvious that e1 > 0, and that e1 < 1 i¤ r < (1 M)[u(q)  c(q)]=c(q).
This completes the proof. 
The model with Tj = 0 has the same qualitative properties, although  and e change,
and as in the previous section we state the results without proof.
Proposition 5 Assume Tj = 0. If  = 0 there does not exist a monetary equilibrium. If
 > 0 then there is a critical value e0, where e0 > 0 for all parameter values and e0 < 1
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i¤ r < (1  M)[u(q)   c(q)]=c(q), such that the following is true: if  < e0 there exists
a unique monetary equilibrium and it entails  = 1 and q < q, with @q=@ > 0 and
lim!e0 q = q; and if  > e0 there exists a unique monetary equilibrium and it entails
q = q and  = e 0 2 (0; 1), where
e 0 = r [(1  ) (1 M + r)u (q) +  (M + r) c (q)]
[r (  M) +M (1 M) (2   1)] [u (q)  c (q)] :
As in the previous section, we again nd that the two objects are traded asymmetrically:
randomization may be used for trading money but not for trading goods. Figure 2 shows
 and q as functions of  (the gure shows e < 1, which holds i¤ r is not too big). Notice
that q  q for all , with strict inequality i¤  < e, where q is the e¢ cient quantity
satisfying u0(q) = c0(q). It is argued in Trejos and Wright (1995) that it is natural to
have q below q in a monetary economy, although in the model in that paper, without
lotteries, the result does not actually hold very generally: it holds when  = 1=2 in the
model where Tj = 0, but it may not hold for other values of , and it may not hold in the
model where Tj = Vj even if  = 1=2. With lotteries, q can never exceed q irrespective of
threat points or bargaining power.
Some results for this model are similar to those for the indivisible goods model. For
example, the behavior of  with respect to the parameters , r and M is the same. There
are also di¤erences. For one thing, in the indivisible goods model we have  < 1, and hence
we denitely have  < 1 for high , but in the divisible goods model we can guarantee  < 1
for high  i¤r is not too big. Also, in the indivisible goods model monetary equilibria do not
exist for low , but in the divisible goods model a monetary equilibrium exists for all  > 0.
Finally, recall that lotteries could reduce welfare in the indivisible goods model. Lotteries
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Figure 2: Monetary Equilibrium as a Function of .
can only improve welfare here: for   e, q and therefore welfare is the same with or without
lotteries; for  > e, q = q with lotteries and q > q without lotteries, and therefore welfare
is strictly higher with lotteries.8 Lotteries can reduce welfare in the indivisible goods
model by causing monetary equilibrium to break down; this never happens in the divisible
goods model (i.e., monetary equilibrium always exists), and moreover lotteries can enhance
welfare by eliminating overproduction in this model.
5 Discussion
We have seen that although agents may agree to a lottery where money changes hands with
probability less than 1, they will never agree to a lottery where goods change hands with
probability less than 1. What lies behind this asymmetry? It is not due to the assumption
that money is indivisible while goods are divisible, because the same asymmetry arises
when goods and money are both indivisible. One conjecture is that asymmetry is due to
8Welfare is higher because q is at rather than above the e¢ cient quantity, and note that welfare does
not depend on  ; see the next section for a more explicit analysis.
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the at nature of the money i.e., to the fact that it has no intrinsic worth and derives
value only from its role as a medium of exchange. To investigate this, and some other
things, we consider several variations on the basic theme.
One approach is to consider a model with direct barter instead of monetary exchange.
For example, suppose some agents consume good 1 and produce good 2, while some con-
sume good 2 and produce good 1. Goods are indivisible, production of good j costs Cj > 0,
and consumption yields utility Uj. Assume Ui > Cj, for all i; j. When two agents of the
opposite type meet they bargain over lotteries. Let  be the bargaining power of type 1,
and let  j be the probability that type j gives up his production good.9 Then it is easy
to prove the following (details available upon request): there are critical values  and ,
with 0 <  <  < 1, such that: if  <  then  1 = 1 and  2 2 (0; 1); if      then
 1 =  2 = 1; and if  >  then  2 = 1 and  1 2 (0; 1).
Hence, agents get their consumption goods with probability less than 1 i¤ they have
su¢ ciently low bargaining power, in a model with direct barter, while it was not possible
to get goods with probability less than 1 when agents were trading with at money. So it
seems there is something to the notion that asymmetry is due to the nature of at money.
To explore things further, consider a model with one indivisible good and money, as in
Section 3, but assume now that the money is a commodity money, in the sense that it
yields a direct utility ow  > 0 to an agent holding it.
Let  and  be the probabilities that money and goods change hands (we do not need
9After trading, one can assume agents return to the market, as in the money model, or that they exit
the economy, as in Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), say. We have explored these and several other sets
of assumptions, some that generate models very similar to the one in Rubinstein and Wolinsky; the same
qualitative results held for all the barter models we explored. Note that lotteries are not useful in the basic
model presented by Rubinstein and Wolinsky, but only because that model assumes one good is divisible
and utility is linear, while whenever we assume divisible goods we always assume that either u(q) is strictly
concave or c(q) is strictly convex.
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two conditional probabilities 0 and 1 because one can show, as above, that 0 = 1).
Then the value functions satisfy
rV0 = M [ (V1   V0)  C] (15)
rV1 = (1 M) [U +  (V0   V1)] + :
The bargaining solution is exactly as above. Then we have the following generalization of
Proposition 1 (for brevity we only present results for the case Tj = Vj, but the other case
is essentially the same).
Proposition 6 Let  = (r + M)U  MC. If  >  then for all  there exists a unique
monetary equilibrium and it entails  = 1 and  = e 2 (0; 1). If  2 (0; ) then there are
critical values  and , with 0 <  <  < 1, such that the following is true: if  <  there
exists a unique monetary equilibrium and it entails  = 1 and  = e 2 (0; 1), where
e = [U + (1  )C]
(U   C) [M (1  )C    (1 M)U ] + rCU ;
if  2 [; ] there exists a unique monetary equilibrium and it entails  = 1 and  = 1; and
if  >  there exists a unique monetary equilibrium and it entails  = 1 and  = e 2 (0; 1),
where
e = r [C + (1  )U ]
 + (  M)(U   C) :
Proof: See the Appendix.
We rst emphasize that  > 0 implies that a monetary equilibrium exists for all , while
with at money there was no monetary equilibrium for small  (there is no discontinuity,
however, since ! 0 as  ! 0). However, the key result is that when  > 0 we can have
 2 (0; 1); i.e., goods can trade with probability less than 1 against commodity money,
even though they could not trade with probability less than 1 against at money. So it
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seems that it is not money per se that generates the asymmetry, but at money. Before
pursuing this issue further, however, we want to highlight some substantive results that
emerge from the commodity money model.
First, note that for large  we must  2 (0; 1), and indeed, as  !1 we have  ! 0.
This is a version of Greshams Law: very valuable money will be hoarded, in the sense
that the probability it changes hands will be small.10 However, even though the money is
hoarded, the good still changes hands with probability 1. Moreover, one can show that in
the divisible goods version of the model with commodity money, with lotteries, for big  we
have q = q with probability 1. Hence, a su¢ ciently valuable money may probabilistically
stop circulating, but the outcome is nevertheless e¢ cient. By contrast, without lotteries,
a su¢ ciently valuable money also will be hoarded, but in this case trade will shut down,
and welfare will be reduced.
Returning to the issue of asymmetry, we have seen that goods can trade with probability
less than 1 against a money that has some exogenously specied value commodity value
. In fact, we will now show that goods can trade with probability less than 1 against
a at money if there is some value to the at money that arises endogenously due to, in
this case, heterogeneity in bargaining. In particular, consider a generalization of the model
with indivisible goods and at money where we now assume that with probability ! the
buyer gets to make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the seller, while with probability 1   !
they bargain according to the Nash solution, with bargaining power  and threat points
Tj = Vj, as above. The chance of meeting a seller and making a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er
generates an endogenous return to holding at money that will play a role analogous to
10See Velde, Weber and Wright (1998) for an extended discussion of Greshams Law in search models
with heterogeneous commodity monies, although we point out that it seems as though at least some of the
results in that paper could change if one allows lotteries.
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the role of  in the commodity money model.11
Let ( ; ) be the lottery that results from the Nash solution and (b ; ^) that which results
from the take-it-or-leave-it o¤er (again we do not need conditional probabilities 0 and 1,
or ^0 and ^1, since it turns out that 0 = 1 =  and ^0 = ^1). The value functions satisfy
rV1 = (1 M) f!
h
^U + b (V0   V1)i+ (1  !) [U +  (V0   V1)]g
rV0 = M (1  !) [(V1   V0)  C]
In the equation for V0 we have used the fact that the seller gets no surplus when the buyer
makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er: b(V1   V0)   ^C. Moreover, this condition also implies
that either b = 1 and ^ = V1 V0
C
, or b = C
V1 V0 and ^ = 1. In the Appendix we show
that generically we cannot have b = 1 and ^ = V1 V0
C
; hence we proceed to characterize
equilibria with b = C
V1 V0 and ^ = 1.
In the interest of manageability, and since we are only interesting in show that it is
possible to have  2 (0; 1), we assume in what follows that !  ! = (U C)[(1 M)U+CM ]
C[rU+M(U C)] ,
which serves to guarantee that for all parameter values monetary equilibria exists.
Proposition 7 Assume !  !. Then for all parameters there exists an equilibrium with
b < 1, ^ = 1, and  and  described as follows. There are critical values 
1
and 1
constructed in the proof, with 0 < 
1
< 1 < 1, such that: if  < 1 then  = 1 and  < 1;
if 
1
<  < 1 then  = 1 and 1 = 1; and if  > 1 then  < 1 and  = 1.
Proof: See Appendix.
11This model was inspired by comments by the associate editor, although his suggestion actually was
to endow di¤erent agents with (permanently) di¤erent bargaining powers. This suggestion also works,
although it turns out to be a lot cleaner if we assume that agents have di¤erent bargaining powers in
di¤erent meetings, but are all identical in an ex ante sense.
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The key part of this result is that we can have  < 1 in this model, just like in the
commodity money model.12 One way to understand what is going on is to think about the
model in the following way. Agents believe that there is some economy-wide probability 
with which they can get goods for a unit of money. Then, when a particular buyer-seller
pair meet, they bargain over the probability  that they will use to trade, taking  as
given. This generates a version of a best response function, of which an equilibrium is a
xed point. For the commodity money model, the best response function can easily be
shown to be  = min f(); 1g, where () is linear:
() =
U + (1  )C
CU (1 + r)
f + [(1 M)U +MC]g :
If  = 0, we are back to at money, and one sees that the intercept of () is zero.
When  is small, the slope of  is less than 1, and given any economy-wide  our particular
buyer-seller pair will bargain to  < , so the only xed point is  = 0. When  is big, the
slope of () is greater than 1, and given  > 0 our pair will bargain to  > , so  = 1 is
xed point, as well as  = 0. With  > 0, however, the intercept of () is strictly positive,
and so there is a unique xed point, it is always positive, and it less than 1 i¤  is small.
Intuitively, the idea is that even if other agents are giving goods with probability  = 0 in
exchange for money, as long as  > 0 you would be willing to trade your good with some
positive probability to get a unit of money. This is why the model with  > 0 always has
 > 0, and can have  < 1. The idea is essentially the same when ! > 0. Any value to
money outside of the Nash bargain that determines  could actually play the same role.
To close this section we address one nal concern: does the nontrivial role for lotteries
arise when we solve the social planners problem, or only when we impose an arbitrary
12One can show that  is increasing in  when  < 1; that  is decreasing in  when  < 1; and ^ is
independent of  when  = 1 and  = 1, and decreasing in  otherwise. Thus, we could redraw Figure 1,
where now for low ,  is in (0; 1) and increasing in , as opposed to  = 0, and we could also add ^ .
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bargaining solution, in the sense of an arbitrary value of ?13 Thus, consider a world with
an exogenous supply ofM units of a real asset (commodity money) with ow return  > 0.
Goods as well as the asset are indivisible, and there is a unit storage capacity, as always.
The social planner gets to choose a lottery ( ; ). Welfare is given by
W = MV1 + (1 M)V0 = M(1 M)(U   C) +N;
which is increasing in  (since production plus consumption generates net social utility),
and independent of  (as it does not matter in the aggregate who holds the asset, it cannot
matter if it changes hands).
The planner is faced with the following incentive constraints:
(V1   V0)  C  0 which holds i¤ r 

 + (1 M)(U   C)
C


U + (V0   V1)  0 which holds i¤ r 

  M(U   C)
U

 :
Notice that if  = 0, then the second constraint is not binding and the rst holds i¤
r  (1 M)(U   C)=C, which does not depend on . Thus, with  = 0 there is no role
for lotteries, since: (i)  does not a¤ect the incentive conditions and  < 1 only makes
them less likely to hold; and (ii) the objective functionW is una¤ected by  and increasing
in . This means that either  = 1 is feasible, in which case we can always set  = 1, or
 = 1 is not feasible, in which case we cannot do better than autarchy.
Figure ?? shows the sets of points in lottery space satisfying the incentive conditions
for various parameter congurations.14 In fact, all the cases are similar, in the sense that
the set of feasible lotteries looks qualitatively the same, except for where the point (1; 1)
13This issue was also raised by a referee.
14The gure is drawn by solving for the  = 0() and  = 1() that solve the two incentive conditions
with equality. The values for r and r in the gure are given by r = [  M(U   C)]=U and r = [ + (1 
M)(U   C)]=C.
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lies relative to this set, which is relevant for the role of lotteries. In case 1a, for example,
(1; 1) is not feasible; it is feasible to choose the e¢ cient  = 1, but only if  < 1. This
case corresponds to a large value of  relative to r, which means holders of the asset would
not give it up with probability 1 to get the good, but they would give it up with some
probability  < 1, and therefore we need lotteries to get trade. In case 1b, it is feasible to
choose  = 1 for  in some range that includes 1, which means we do not need lotteries.
In case 1c, we cannot have  = 1; the best  that we can achieve is attained by setting
 = 1, but this requires  < 1. In this case,  is small relative to r, and so again we need
lotteries but this time it is the good that trades with probability less than 1.15
15Note that there is no discontinuity at  = 0: as  ! 0, 1() approaches the vertical axis and 0()
approaches a line which coincides with the vertical axis up to  = rC=(1  N)(U   c) and then becomes
horizontal, which gives exactly the set of incentive feasible lotteries with  = 0.
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Incentive Feasible Allocations in Lottery Space
The bottom line is that there can be a nontrivial role for lotteries when  > 0, either
because we need to set  < 1 to achieve  = 1, or because the best  that we can achieve
is less than 1. This is interesting because it answers in the a¢ rmative the question as
to whether lotteries are needed for the e¢ cient outcome, as opposed to the equilibrium
outcome for arbitrary bargaining weights. It is also interesting because one might think
from the analysis in Section 3 that lotteries can only reduce welfare in an indivisible goods
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model. That was true because, with at money, for low values of  nontrivial equilibria
did not exist with lotteries, but they do when lotteries are ruled out. The present analysis
shows that at least with commodity money there is an e¢ ciency-enhancing role for lotteries
in the model.
6 Conclusion
This paper has introduced lotteries into the search-theoretic model of monetary exchange.
It has been shown that, in general, private agents may want to use randomized trading
in this environment. So might a social planner. In the model with indivisible goods, we
discussed how lotteries give us a way to analyze prices, and also how lotteries eliminate the
somewhat unnatural mixed strategy equilibria. When goods are divisible, we found that
the quantity produced is never more than the e¢ cient quantity (which is not generally
true without lotteries). Also, we found that as a commodity money gets more and more
valuable, it drops out of circulation probabilisitically but the outcome is still e¢ cient (which
is also not true without lotteries). A general conclusion it that future work should take into
account the fact that lotteries can have a nontrivial role to play in monetary economics.
Appendix
1. Proof of Proposition 6: The argument is similar to the proof of Proposition 1,
although here we use the fact that 0 = 1 = . First order conditions for the bargaining
problem are:
  [ (V1   V0)  C] (V1   V0)
+ (1  ) [ (V0   V1) + U ] (V1   V0)    0; = if  > 0
 [ (V1   V0)  C]U   (1  ) [ (V0   V1) + U ]C     0; = if  > 0
(16)
Given  > 0, the rst condition in (16) holds with equality. Consider the case  < 1, which
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implies  = 1, as in Proposition 1. Substitute the Vjs into rst condition in (16), we can
solve for  = e , where e is dened above, and show e 2 (0; 1) i¤
 >  =
(r +M)U  MC   
(1 + r)(U   C) :
Notice  > 0 i¤ (r +M)U  MC > . The incentive conditions are satised at  = e and
 = 1. Hence, there exists an equilibrium with  = 1 and  = e 2 (0; 1) i¤  > .
Now consider the case where  = 1. Inserting the Vjs into the second equation in (16)
at equality and rearranging, we have
 fU [(1 M)U   (r + 1 M)C + ]  (1  )C [(r +M)U  MC   ]g = (1 + r):
Consider the case  < 1, which implies  = 0 and  = 1. Given this, we can substitute
the Vjs into second condition in (16) at equality and solve for  = e, where e is dened
above. Notice e 2 (0; 1) i¤  < , where
 =
C [rU +M(U   C)  ]
(U   C) (U(1 M) + CM + ) :
The incentive conditions are satised at  = e. Hence, there exists an equilibrium with
 = 1 and  = e < 1 i¤  < .
Finally, consider  =  = 1: Note that  = 1 satises the rst condition in (16) i¤
   and  = 1 satises the second condition i¤   . Also, the incentive compatibility
constraints are satised at  =  = 1. Hence, there exists an equilibrium with  = 1 and
 = 1 i¤     . Also, it is easy to see that  <  implies 0 <  <  < 1 and  > 
implies  < 0. 
2. Proof that we cannot have b = 1 and ^ = V1 V0
C
: Assuming b = 1 and ^ = V1 V0
C
,
we will derive a contradiction from the rst order conditions from the Nash bargaining
problem for ( ; ) (these are given explicitly in the proof of Proposition 7). There are
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several cases. First, we cannot have  =  = 0 in a monetary equilibrium, and we cannot
have ;  < 1 because this generate the same contradiction as Proposition 1. Now suppose
 < 1 and  = 1; then the rst order conditions, which are again given by (16), imply
CU =
[U + (1  )C] (1  !) [(1 M)U +MC]
r + (1 M)! (1  U=C) + 1  ! ;
after substituting the value functions; this can hold only for degenerate parameter values.
Now suppose  = 1 and   1; then the rst order conditions imply
 [(V1   V0)  C] = (1  ) [U    (V1   V0)] ;
which implies  = (1 )U+C
V1 V0 > 1 because V1   V0  C (otherwise ^ > 1). In each case we
have a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 7: We are looking for equilibria with b = C
V1 V0 , ^ = 1, and ( ; )
satisfying the rst order conditions, which are again given by (16). Again we emulate the
proof of Proposition 1 and consider each combination of ( ; ) in turn. As above, we cannot
have ;  < 1.
Now consider  < 1 and  = 1. The second equation in (16) implies, after inserting the
value functions,
 =
[U + (1  )C] (1 M)! (U   C)
CU (r + 1  !)  (1  !) [U + (1  )C] [(1 M)U +MC] :
One can check that the rst condition in (16) is satised, and that  < 1 i¤
 < 
1
=
C [Ur + (M   !) (U   C)]
(U   C) f(1 M)! (U   C) + (1  !) [(1 M)U +MC]g :
One can also solve for
b = CU (r + 1  !)  (U + (1  )C) (1  !) [(1 M)U +MC]
U (1 M)! (U   C) ;
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and show that b < 1 under the assumption !  !. Hence, equilibrium exists with b < 1,
 < 1 and  = 1 for all  2 [0; 
1
).
Consider  = 1 and  = 1. Then
b = C (r + 1  !)
(1 M)U +MC   !C :
The rst order conditions can be shown to hold i¤ 
1
   1, where
1 =
rU + (M   !) (U   C)
(1  ! + r) (U   C) :
Hence, equilibrium exists with b < 1 and  =  = 1 for all  2 [
1
; 1].
Now consider  = 1 and  < 1. The rst equation in (16) implies
 =
r [(1  )U + C]
[  M + ! (1  )] (U   C) :
The second condition in (16) is satised i¤  > 
1
, and  < 1 i¤  > 1. Also,
b = rC [U (  M) + C (M   !)]
[(1 M)U + (M   !)C] [  M + ! (1  )] (U   C) :
One can show that b < 1. Hence, equilibrium exists with b < 1,  < 1 and  = 1 for all
 > 1. 
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